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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Following a brief delay due to mid-level clouds, Columbia lifted off Pad 39B on
June 5, 1991 at 9:24:51 a.m. Eastern Daylight Savings Time (EDT) to begin the nine-day
STS-40 Spacelab Life Sciences (SLS-1) mission. All systems performed nominally during
launch and ascent. This was the second launch attempt of STS-40.
Significant STS-40 anomalies included:
Inertial Measurement Unit #2 calibration failures, leading to the scrub of the
first launch attempt.
The loosening of 1307 bulkhead thermal blankets and separation and
protrusion of the port-side 1307 bulkhead environmental seal.
Significant heat effects of the fight-hand External Tank (ET) umbilical door
centerline latch.
Columbia was cleared for an ontime entry and landing at Edwards Air Force Base
on June 14, 1991. STS-40 touched down at 11:40 a.m. EDT on runway 22. The Flight
Director reported no anomalies during entry, and all systems looked good. Crew egress
was assisted for the first time by a "people mover", a converted airport mobile lounge.
The "people mover" was outfitted with a full suite of medical equipment and staff to
perform a quick medical examination of the astronauts before their bodies had a chance
to adapt to gravity. Four of the 7 crew members remained at the Ames-Dryden Flight
Research Facility for an additional week of biomedical testing.
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FOREWORD
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) is a National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Headquarters Safety Division, Code QS produced document that
is prepared for use by the NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and Mission
Quality (OSMQ), and the Space Shuttle Program Director prior to each Space Shuttle
flight. The intent of the MSE is to document safety risk factors that represent a change,
or potential change, to the risk baselined by the Program Requirements Control Board
(PRCB) in the Space Shuttle Hazard Reports (HRs). Unresolved safety risk factors
impacting the STS-40 flight were also documented prior to the STS-40 Flight Readiness
Review (FRR) (FRR Edition) and prior to the STS-40 Launch Minus Two-Day (L-2)
Review (L-2 Edition). This final Postflight Edition evaluates performance against safety
risk factors identified in the previous MSE editions for this mission.
The MSE is published on a mission-by-mission basis for use in the FRR and
is updated for the L-2 Review. For tracking and archival purposes, the MSE is issued in
final report format after each Space Shuttle flight.
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) provides the Associate Administrator, Office
of Safety and Mission Quality (OSMQ), and the Space Shuttle Program Director with
the NASA Headquarters Safety Division position on changes, or potential changes, to the
Program safety risk baseline approved in the formal Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) and Hazard Analysis process. While some
changes to the baseline since the previous flight are included to highlight their
significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to ensure that changes which
were too late to include in formal changes through the FMEA/CIL and Hazard Analysis
process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance
rationale.
1.2 Scope
This report addresses STS-40 safety risk factors that represent a change from
previous flights, factors from previous flights that had an impact on this flight, and
factors that are unique to this flight.
Factors listed in the MSE are essentially limited to items that affect, or have the
potential to affect, Space Shuttle safety risk factors and have been elevated to Level I for
discussion or approval. These changes are derived from a variety of sources such as
issues, concerns, problems, and anomalies. It is not the intent to attempt to scour lower
level files for items dispositioned and closed at those levels and report them here; it is
assumed that their significance is such that Level I discussion or approval is not
appropriate for them. Items against which there is dearly no safety impact or potential
concern will not be reported here, although items that were evaluated at some length
and found not to be a concern will be reported as such. NASA Safety Reporting System
(NSRS) issues are considered along with the other factors, but may not be specifically
identified as such.
Data gathering is a continuous process. However, collating and focusing of MSE
data for a specific mission begins prior to the mission Launch Site Flow Review (LSFR)
and continues through the flight and return of the Orbiter to Kennedy Space Center
(KSC). For archival purposes, the MSE is updated subsequent to the mission to add
items identified too late for inclusion in the prelaunch report and to document
performance of the anomalous systems for possible future use in safety evaluations.
1-1 STS-40 Postflight Edition
1.3 Organization
The MSE is presented in eight sections as follows:
Section 1 - Provides brief introductory remarks, including purpose, scope,
and organization.
Section 2 Provides a summary description of the STS-40 mission,
including launch data, crew size, mission duration, launch and
landing sites, and other mission- and payload-related
information.
Section 3 Contains a list of safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved
or not a safety concern prior to STS-40 launch, that were
impacted or repeated by anomalies reported for the STS-40
flight.
Section 4 Comains a list of safety risk factors that were considered
resolved for STS-40.
Section 5 Contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) that developed
during the STS-39 mission, the previous Space Shuttle flight.
Section 6 - Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-35
mission, the previous flight of the Orbiter vehicle (OV-102).
Section 7 Contains a list of WAs that developed during the STS-40
mission. Those IFAs considered to represent a safety risk will
be addressed in the MSE for the next Space Shuttle flight.
Section 8 Contains background and historical data on the issues,
problems, concerns, and anomalies addressed in Sections 3
through 7. This section is not normally provided as part of the
MSE, but is available upon request. It contains presentation
data, white papers, and other documentation. These data were
used to support the resolution rationale or retention of open
status for each item discussed in the MSE.
Appendix A - Provides a list of acronyms used in this report.
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SECTION 2
STS-40 MISSION SUMMARY
2.1 Summary Description of the STS-40 Mission
Following a brief delay due to mid-level clouds, Columbia lifted off Pad 39B on
June 5, 1991 at 9:24:51 a.m. Eastern Daylight Savings Time (EDT) to begin the 9-day
STS-40 Spacelab Life Sciences (SLS-1) mission. All systems performed nominally during
launch and ascent. This was the second launch attempt of STS-40.
The first launch attempt on June 1, 1991, was scrubbed when problems were
found with Inertial Measurement Unit #2 (IMU #2) during prelaunch calibration runs.
Data from the first calibration run indicated that the Y-axis accelerometer experienced a
5.54-sigma excursion before stabilizing. Repeated attempts at calibrating IMU #2
resulted in exceeding the Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
Document (OMRSD) limit of 5 sigma and required the replacement of IMU #2 prior to
flight. IMU #2 was removed and replaced prior to the successful launch of
STS-40/OV-102.
Soon after the Payload Bay Doors (PLBDs) were opened, video downlink of the aft
1307 bulkhead revealed that several thermal blankets were dislodged and damaged. In
addition to the loose thermal blankets, a section of the port-side 1307 bulkhead PLBD
environmental seal was separated from its retainer and protruded into the Payload Bay.
These anomalies were indicative of air intrusion into the Payload Bay during ascent.
Further inspection determined that the protruding seal had separated at a repair splice
at the Y0 = - 33-inch position on the bulkhead. There were 2 protruding pieces; the
inboard piece was approximately 22 inches long, the outboard piece was approximately
8 inches long. There was concern that the protruding seal could prevent the port PLBD
from fully closing for entry. Because analysis findings indicated that the seal could
interfere with the PLBD locking mechanism, an Extravehicular Activity (EVA)
demonstration was performed at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). An astronaut,
wearing EVA gloves, performed several tests which included replacing the seal in its
retainer and cutting the protruding portions of the seal. These tests proved successful.
The decision was made to close the PLBDs on the nominal timeline for entry. The
PLBDs were successfully closed and locked for entry with no indication that the
protruding seal interfered with closure. Postflight inspection found that the seal had
separated at the inboard side of the repair splice. There was no indication of damage
from entry heating in the area of the separation. See Section 7, Orbiter 2 for further
details of this anomaly.
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For STS-40launch, the modified debris containment device attach link system was
used for the first time. The results were moderately successful; there were no stud hang-
ups, thread impressions, or broaching. Review of launch films indicated that a NASA
Standard Initiator (NSI) cartridge escaped from Holddown Post (HI)P) #5 and a
frangible nut half escaped from HDP #3. Post-recovery inspection found HDP #3 and
HDP #5 properly seated, most likely jarred into proper position at water impact. The
plunger on HDP #7 was obstructed by a nut half. While these results were somewhat
discouraging, there were no plans to alter the modified attach link design prior to the
next launch.
Several other anomalies occurred during the mission; however, none were a threat
to the safe completion of the STS-40 mission. These included a Reaction Control
System (RCS) vernier thruster failing off on its initial firing, a Lithium Hydroxide
(LiOH) canister access door was opened with the assistance of tools, a thermal blanket
came loose from the tunnel adapter top hatch, S-Band communications problems, and
repeated failures of the SLS-1 refrigerator/freezers.
Columbia was cleared for an ontime entry and landing at Edwards Air Force Base
on June 14, 1991. STS40 touched down at 11:40 a.m. EDT on runway 22. The Flight
Director reported no anomalies during entry, and all systems looked good. Crew egress
was assisted for the first time by a "people mover", a converted airport mobile lounge.
The "people mover" was outfitted with a full suite of medical equipment and staff to
perform a quick medical examination of the astronauts before their bodies had a chance
to adapt to gravity. Four of the 7 crew members remained at the Ames-Dryden Flight
Research Facility for an additional week of biomedical testing.
Post-landing inspection of STS-40/OV-102 identified significant heat effects
(melting) of the fight-hand External Tank (ET) umbilical door centerline latch. Thermal
Protection System (TPS) tile near the latch also showed signs of erosion around the
edges. The umbilical door pressure seal, however, was not breached. The most
probable cause of this anomaly was improper step-and-gap in the area. The step-and-
gap around the right-hand ET door was recorded to be correct. See Section 7, Orbiter 4
for further details.
Columbia is the only Orbiter equipped with cameras in the ET umbilical cavity.
Postflight review of ET separation film identified a cylindrical object floating away from
the left-hand umbilical cavity. Film analysis determined that the object was an umbilical
guide-pin bushing. See Section 7, Orbiter 6 for further details.
2-2 STS-40 Postflight Edition
2.2 Flight/Vehicle Data
• Launch Date: June 5, 1991
• Launch Time: 9:24:51 a.m. EDT
• Launch Site: KSC Pad 39B
• RTLS: Kennedy Space Center, Shuttle Landing Facility
TAL Site: Ben Guerir, Morocco
Alternate TAL Site: Moron, Spain
Landing Site: Edwards AFB, CA, Runway 22
Landing Date: June 14, 1991
Landing Time: 8:39 a.m. PDT
Landing Weight: 226,000 Pounds
Mission Duration: 9 Days
Crew Size: 7
Inclination: 39 °
Altitude: 160 x 150 Nautical Miles/Direct Insertion
Orbiter: OV-102 (11) Columbia
ET-41
SRBs: BI-044
RSRM Flight Set #16
MLP #3
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ENGINE #2015 #2022 #2027
POWERHEAD #2107 #2022 #4004
MCC* #2029 #4006 #2024
NOZZLE #4001 #2023 #2027
CONTROLLER F15 F7 F23
FASCOS* #25 #22 #20
HPFTP* #4013R 1 #6007111 #4109R 1
LPFTP* #2216 #82207R 1 #4005
HPOTP* #4010113 #4502R2 #6008R 1
LPOTP* #4401 #2104R 1 #4302
* Acronyms can be found in Appendix A.
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2.3 Miscellaneous Items of Interest for the STS-40 Mission.
This was the last mission with the old General Purpose Computers (GPCs),
AP-101B, in all 6 GPC positions (5 active, 1 spare). The new GPCs,
AP-101S, will be installed on OV-102 during the major modification effort
following STS-40.
The nominal External Tank (El') impact area was latitude 1.90" North,
longitude 140.10" West; approximately 1400 miles southeast of Hawaii.
tumble valve was deactivated for this mission.
The
The Hydrogen Dispersal System was installed on Mobile Launch Platform
(MLP) #3. This completes the installation of the Hydrogen Dispersal System
on all MLPs.
The 31-psig Gaseous Oxygen (GOX) Flow Control Valves (FCVs) were
shimmed to the step III (78%) high-flow position and electrically
disconnected so that the FCVs could not transition to the low-flow position.
This emulates the final fixed-orifice configuration for the FCV.
This was the first flight of Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) #2015,
located in the engine #1 position. SSME #2015 employs the first Multiple
Inlet, Single Outlet (MISO) heat exchanger bypass orifice. This change
reduces the potential of blockage that was associated with the single inlet,
single outlet orifice used on other engines. Blockage of the heat exchanger
bypass orifice could lead to a Criticality 1 event. The MISO was certified in
92 hot-fire tests and nearly 40,000 seconds (sec) of operation.
The modified debris containment device attach link system was installed for
the first time on the Holddown Posts supporting the STS-40 stack. This
modification is in response to the problems experienced with stud hangup
and debris release. The attach link diameter and length have been optimized
for desired performance. The silicone rubber isolator geometry has been
modified to eliminate premature fracture of the attach link and to eliminate
the potential for isolator debris. The plunger geometry has also been
modified to provide clearance for the new attach link and rubber isolator.
The center-forward segment of the Left-Hand (LH) Solid Rocket Motor
(SRM) was inadvertently moved in a rail car without the Transportation
Loads Monitoring System installed prior to shipment to the Kennedy Space
Center. A report indicated that the rail car containing the segment was
mistaken for another rail car requiring routine maintenance and was believed
empty when it was removed from the Thiokol Corporation (TC) grounds.
The TC Senior Material Review Board assessed the potential loads induced
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during transportation to Salt Lake City, UT for maintenance and approved
the segment for flight (Nonconformance Report GFP 405065-01).
STS-40 RSRM Flight Set #16 was manufactured using Ammonium
Perchlorate (AP) produced at the new Western Electro Chemical
Corporation (WECCO) AP plant located in southern Utah. WECCO AP
was qualified for flight in part through its use in Flight Support Motor-1 test
firing.
Relative to the High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump (I-IPOTP) first stage
turbine disc interstage pilot rib cracking, the HPOTPs installed on
OV-102/STS-40 were well within established Deviation Approval Request
(DAR) limitation. All had less than 5 starts greater than 20 sec after this
flight versus the DAR limit of no more than 14 starts greater than 20 sec.
2.4 Payload Data
Spacelab Life Sciences-1 (SLS-1) was the first in a series of dedicated life sciences
missions planned to determine the effects of microgravity on humans and animals. The
SLS-1 payload was a joint Johnson Space Center (JSC) and Ames Research Center
(ARC) effort. The mission focused on the investigation of known problems with manned
space flight employing human and animal subjects and the conduct of experiments that
addressed fundamental biological problems. The crew performed experiments that
explored how the heart, blood vessels, lungs, kidneys, and hormone-secreting glands
respond to microgravity; the causes of space sickness; changes in muscles, bones, and
cells during the microgravity environment of space flight; and the readjustment to gravity
upon return to Earth.
There were some animal experiments on SLS-1 that required the injection of
minute levels of radioactive material. The presence of these small radioactive/nuclear
sources was reported by NASA Headquarters to the Assistant to the President for Space
and Technology in accordance with their directives.
Changes were made to STS-40 Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) to include the
Minimum Equipment List for SLS-1. One of the many changes made included the
provision for allowing launch with 1 of 2 Auxiliary Electrical Buses. The Auxiliary
Electrical Bus powers Fire Detection and Suppression, the SLS-1 vent valve, and
experiment ventilation. If one Auxiliary Electrical Bus falls prior to launch, a subsequent
loss of the remaining bus would result in the inability to control/extinguish a fire in
SLS-1 by venting the module to space. This inability causes a mission scrub and a next
Primary Landing Site return. The System Safety Review Panel reviewed this LCC and
concurred with its implementation.
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Spacelab Program Safety Review Process. The Spacelab safety review process is
similar to that of other payloads flown on the Space Shuttle. Hazard Reports (HRs)
were developed for the various Spacelab Program elements: the pressurized module,
tunnel adapters, pallets, and Get-Away Special (GAS). The Spacelab Program HRs
were rebaselined in 1987 as part of the total Space Shuttle Program safety rebaselining
effort in preparation for reflight. As Spacelab Program elements are flown (i.e., Astro-1
pallet, SLS-1), design and configuration changes are reviewed to identify potential impact
on the Spacelab risk baseline. This review is performed by the Payload Safety Review
Panel through the Flight Safety Reviews (FSRs). For the STS-40 SLS-1 mission, the
Phase m FSR was held in January 1990. Concerns raised at the Phase m FSR led to 2
Delta Phase Ill FSRs held in June 1990 and March 1991 to resolve remaining issues.
The Spacelab Flight Readiness Review was held on April 26, I99I and cleared SLS-I for
flight. There were no open safety issues relating to the SLS-1 mission.
Payload Bay
SLS-1 mission included 18 primary experiments: 10 using human subjects and
8 using animals.
Experiments Exploring Human Body Capabilities in Space
Influence of Weightlessness Upon Human Autonomic Cardiovascular
Controls -- investigated the theory that lightheadedness and a reduction in
blood pressures in astronauts upon standing after landing may arise
because the normal reflex system regulating blood pressure behaves
differently after having adapted to a microgravity environment. Some
crewmembers wore neck chambers to detect blood pressure in the neck.
Inflight Study of Cardiovascular Deconditioning -- calculated how much
blood is delivered by the heart to the body during space flight. This
experiment used a non-invasive technique of prolonged expiration and
rebreathing -- inhaling in previously exhaled gases -- to measure the
cardiovascular and respiratory changes.
Vestibular Experiments in Spacelab -- investigated Space Motion Sickness
(SMS), any associated changes in inner ear vestibular function during
weightlessness, and the impact of those changes postflight.
Protein Metabolism During Space Flight -- looked at the mechanisms
involved in protein metabolism including changes in protein synthesis
rates, muscle breakdown rates, and use of dietary nitrogen in a weightless
environment.
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Fluid-Electrolyte Regulation During Spaceflight -- investigated the known
changes of fluid, electrolyte, renal, and circulatory processes in humans as
adaptation to the weightless environment. Detailed measurements were
made before, during, and after flight to determine immediate- and
long-term changes in kidney function; changes in water, salt, and mineral
balance; shifts in body fluids from cells and tissues; and immediate- and
long-term changes in levels of hormones which affect kidney function and
drculation.
Pulmonary Function During Weightlessness -- studied the properties of
the human lung without the influence of gravity. The tests were designed
to examine the distribution and movement of blood and gas within the
pulmonary system and how these measurements compare to normal
respiration.
Lymphocyte Proliferation in Weightlessness -- investigated the effect of
weightlessness on the activation of lymphocyte reproduction and tested
whether there is a possible alteration of the cells responsible for part of
the immune defense system during space flight.
Influence of Space Flight on Erythrokinetics in Man -- studied the
mechani_ms which may be responsible for the decrease in circulating red
blood cells or erythrocytes and subsequent reduction in the oxygen
carrying capacity of the blood, including the effect of space flight on red
blood cell production rate and the role of changes in body weight and
plasma volume on red blood cell production.
Cardiovascular Adaptation to Microgravity -- focused on the acute
microgravity-induced changes in the cardiovascular structure and function
responsible for a common problem during return to normal gravity of
orthostatic hypotension or the inability to maintain normal blood pressure
and flow while in an upright position.
Pathophysiology of Mineral Loss During Space Flight -- measured the
changes which occur during space flight in circulating levels of calcium
metabolizing hormones and to directly measure the uptake and release of
calcium in the body. Changes in calcium balance during space flight
appear to be similar to those observed in humans with osteoporosis.
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Experiments on the Functioning of Basic Life Processes Using Animals
B
I
Regulation of Erythropoiesis During Space Flight and
Regulation of Blood Volume During Space Flight -- this combined
investigation determined whether changes seen in red blood cell mass and
blood volume in crews on previous space flights occur in the rat and if the
rat is a satisfactory model for studying microgravity-induced changes in
human blood.
Bone, Calcium and Space Flight -- allowed for more precise calculation of
the length of flight time required to significantly inhibit bone formation in
rats and documented alterations in bone growth patterns and
bone-breaking strength in rodents exposed to weightlessness. It will
determine whether bone formation returns to normal levels after space
flight.
A Study of the Effects of Space Travel on Mammalian Gravity
Receptors -- investigated the structural changes that may occur within the
inner ear in response to the microgravity of space. The vestibular
symptoms from previous space flights included nausea, vomiting, dizziness,
and instability when standing.
Effects of Microgravity-Induced Weightlessness on Aurelia Ephyra
Differentiation and Statolith Synthesis -- studied the gravity receptors of
ephyrae (a type of jellyfish) to determine how microgravity influences
their development and function, as well as the animals' swimming
behavior.
Skeletal Myosin Isoenzymes in Rats Exposed to Microgravity -- examined
how microgravity affects the speed of muscle contractions and should
provide additional data to help explain how microgravity affects the speed
of muscle contractions and the growth and proliferation of slow-twitch and
fast-twitch muscle fibers.
Effects of Microgravity on Biochemical and Metabolic Properties of
Skeletal Muscle in Rats -- evaluated energy metabolism in the hind leg
muscles of the rats exposed to microgravity using radioactive carbon. In
addition, skeletal muscle cells of flight and ground-control animals were
compared to assess any changes in the concentration of enzymes that
break down glycogen.
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Effects of Microgravity on the Electron Microscopy, Histochemistry and
Protease Activities of Rat Hindlimb Muscles -- examined muscle tissues of
flight and ground-control rodents to look for the shrinkage or death of
muscle cells, breakdown of muscle fibers, or degeneration of motor
nerves.
Get-Away Special (GAS) Experiments -- included 12 experiments
-- Solid State Microaccelerometer Experiment
-- Experiment in Crystal Growth
-- Orbital Ball Bearing Experiment (OBBFX)
-- In-Space Commercial Processing
-- Foamed Ultralight Metals
-- Chemical Precipitate Formation
-- Five Microgravity Experiments
-- Flower and Vegetable Seeds Exposure to Space
-- Semiconductor Crystal Growth Experiment
-- Orbiter Stability Experiment
-- Effect of Cosmic Radiation on Floppy Disks & Plant Seeds Exposure to
Microgravity
-- Six Active Soldering Experiments
Middeck
• Physiological Monitoring System (PMS)
• Urine Monitoring System (UMS)
• Animal Enclosure Modules (AEMs)
• Middeck 0-Gravity Dynamics Experiment-0 (MODE-0) -- tested basic
techniques to aid in the development of the full MODE payload, scheduled for
a later flight.
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SECTION 3
SAFETY RISK FACTORS/ISSUES IMPACTED BY STS-40 ANOMALIES
This section lists safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved (or not a safety
concern) for STS-40 prior to launch (see Sections 4, 5, and 6), that were repeated or
related to anomalies that occurred during the STS-40 flight (see Section 7). The list
indicates the section of this Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) Report in which the item
is addressed, the item designation (Element/Number) within that section, a description
of the item, and brief comments concerning the anomalous condition that was reported.
3-1 STS-40 Postflight Edition
ITEM COMMENT
Section 5:STS-39 Inflight Anomalies
Orbiter 3 Reaction Control System
(RCS) vernier thruster F5R
fuel injector temperature
biased low.
IFA No. STS-39-V-03
During firing of STS-39/OV-103 RCS
vernier thruster F5R, the fuel injector
temperature read 3OaF to 40'17 lower
than the oxidizer injector temperature.
This temperature variance should be no
more than 10aF. Postflight trouble-
shooting determined that this anomaly
was caused by poor contact between the
temperature sensor and the thruster.
On STS-40, vernier jet L5L failed off
due to low chamber pressure. L5L was
hot-fired on orbit, reselected, and used
for the remainder of the STS-40 mission
with erratic Chamber Pressure (Pc)- See
Section 7, Orbiter 6 for further details.
Orbiter 4 Operations (OPS) recorder
#2 uncommanded
configuration before launch
[potential Multiplexer-
Demultiplexer (MDM)
hybrid circuit failure].
IFA No. STS-39-V-04
During the second STS-39 launch
attempt, OPS recorder #2 experienced
uncommanded operation; the recorder
was discovered "on" and had changed
tracks. Testing of OPS recorder #2 was
performed prior to launch, with no
further anomalies identified. On Flight
Day (FD) 7, OPS recorder #2 repeated
the prelaunch anomaly. OPS recorder
#2 was subsequently reconfigured from
the ground and operated nominally for
the remainder of the STS-39/OV-103
mission.
During STS-40/OV-102, FD 4, OPS
recorder #2 experienced an
uncommanded mode and track change
similar to the STS-39 anomalies.
Investigation found that this occurrence
was due to an erroneous uplink causing
the mode/track change.
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ITEM
Section 6:STS-35 Infiight Anomalies
Orbiter 4 Payload Bay Door (PLBD)
environmental seal debond.
IFA No. STS-35-V-16
Orbiter 6 Window W-1 has a 0.15-
inch diameter chip.
IFA No. STS-35-V-18
COMMENT
Postflight inspection of STS-35/OV-102
found a 24-inch piece of the
environmental seal teflon material loose
between panels #1 and #2 on the right
PLBD, at the top. The investigation of
the STS-35 anomaly determined that the
failure was the result of interference
with a ground strap, causing the seal to
debond.
The anomaly that received the most
attention on STS-40 was the loosening of
the 1307 bulkhead thermal blankets and
environmental seal. This anomaly was
caused by air intrusion past the PLBD
and 1307 bulkhead during ascent. The
environmental seal was separated at a
repair splice and was unrelated to the
STS-35 anomaly. See Section 7, Orbiter
2 for further details of the STS-40
anomaly.
Postflight inspection of STS-35/OV-102
windows revealed a chip in window W-1.
A "spider web" type crack formation was
radiating from the impact point. The
crew indicated that they first noticed the
chip on FD 6, and it was believed that
impact occurred during ascent.
During postflight inspection of
STS-35/OV-102, window W-5 was found
with a ding measuring 0.0162 inch deep x
0.0663 inch long x 0.0668 inch wide. No
other window problems were noted.
There was no indication by the crew that
they noticed this ding on orbit. Plans
are to replace W-5 before the next
OV-102 mission.
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ITEM
Section 6:STS-35 Inflight Anomalies
Orbiter 8 RCS vernier thruster RSD
failed "off'.
IFA No. STS-35-V-20
COMMENT
During orbital maneuvering, RCS
vernier thruster R5D exhibited low P_
and was deselected by Redundancy
Management (RM). Data evaluation
indicated that helium was present in the
crossfeed line. A similar failure was
seen on STS-9. Vernier thruster RSD
was successfully hot-fired on orbit to
flush out the helium. Evaluation of the
hot-fire data indicated some gas
ingestion during the first pulse and none
in the 4 subsequent pulses. RM was
reset following nominal performance
during the hot-fire.
RCS vernier thruster L5L failed "off'
due to low Pc during the first
commanded firing on STS-40/OV-102.
LSL was hot-fired on orbit, reselected,
and operated for the remainder of the
STS-40 mission with erratic Pc. See
Section 7, Orbiter 6 for further details.
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ITEM
Section 6:STS-35 Inflight An0malie_
Orbiter 9 Orbiter/External Tank
(ET) Liquid Oxygen (LO2)
aft attach/separation hole
plugger did not fully extend.
IFA No. STS-35-V-21
COMMENT
The Orbiter/ET LO 2 aft
attach/separation hole plugger did not
complete its stroke. One of the 2 pyros
was jammed between the plugger and
the rim of the hole. The other pyro
device was not found and may have
escaped. No debris was found on the
runway after the ET doors were opened.
Similar hole plugger failures occurred on
STS-29 and STS-34.
There were no attach/separation hole
plugger anomalies on STS-40. There
was, however, an umbilical separation
guide fitting that detached at ET
separation, witnessed by OV-102 LH 2
ET/Orbiter umbilical camera. See
Section 7, Orbiter 5 for further details.
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SECTION 4
RESOLVED STS-40 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
This section contains a summary of the safety risk factors that were considered
resolved for STS-4O. These items were reviewed by the NASA Safety Community. A
description and information regarding problem resolution are provided for each safety
risk factor. The safety position with respect to rationale for flight is based on findings
resulting from System Safety Review Panel (SSRP), Prelaunch Assessment Review
(PAR), and Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) evaluations (or other special
panel findings, etc.). It represents the safety assessment arrived at in accordance with
actions taken, efforts conducted, and tests/retests and inspections performed to resolve
each specific problem.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each risk factor in this section are
listed beneath the risk factor title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
risk factor, or if the associated FIR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
The following risk factors in this section represented a low-to-moderate increase
in risk above the Level I approved hazard risk baseline. The NASA Safety Community
assessed the relative risk increase of each and determined that the associated increase
was acceptable.
Integration 1 New Criticality 1 and 1R2 failure modes have been identified for
the Rate Gyro Assemblies on the Orbiter and Solid Rocket
Boosters.
Integration 2 Upgrade of Engine Interface Unit loss of output Critical Items List
to Criticality 1/1.
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SECTION 4 INDEX
RESOLVED STS-40 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
INTEGRATION
1
2
3
PAGE
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
New Criticality 1 and 1R2 failure modes have been identified for the 4-4
Rate Gyro Assemblies on the Orbiter and Solid Rocket Boosters.
Upgrade of Engine Interface Unit loss of output Critical Items List to 4-8
Criticality 1/1.
Auxiliary Power Unit/Hydraulic Power Unit Quick Disconnect O-ring 4-10
material issue.
Cabin pressure bleed valve anomalies on OV-105. 4-12
STS-37/OV-104 short touchdown at Edwards Air Force Base lakebed 4-14
runway.
External Tank door lug clevis cracks on OV-102. 4-17
Wing struts below minimum wall thickness on OV-102. 4-19
OV-102 Freon Coolant Loop #1 flow rate degradation prior to 4-20
STS-35.
A Main Propulsion System 3-way helium solenoid valve failed leak 4-22
tests on OV-102 during the STS-40 flow.
Gaseous Hydrogen Flow Control Valve weld crack found on OV-103. 4-26
OV-102 left Orbital Maneuvering System Reaction Control System 4-28
helium isolation valves found with an internal leak.
OV-102 flight-critical data bus #3 wiring found damaged during 4-30
midbody closeout.
STS-40/OV-102 left-hand Main Landing Gear valve did not transition 4-32
to "off' during gear retraction.
OV-105 T-handle access door for the emergency egress window 4-33
jettison opened during ferry flight.
Flight Critical Multiplexer-Demultiplexer, Flight Aft-2, indicated 4-36
anomalous operation.
General Purpose Computer #4 failure on STS-40/OV-102. 4-38
Main Propulsion System cryogenic temperature transducer failure. 4-40
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SECTION 4 INDEX - CONTINUED
RESOLVED STS-40 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
SRM
1
2
RISK
FACTOR
STS-37 fight-hand cowl bond line blowpaths.
STS-39 left-hand nozzle throat assembly bond line void.
PAGE
4-45
4-46
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SECTION 5
STS-39 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
STS-39 mission, the previous Space Shuttle flight. The IFA list hacluded in this section is
not all inclusive. Only those STS-39/OV-103 IFAs which represented a potential safety
concern are addressed. Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk acceptance
information and rationale are provided. STS-39 IFAs still considered as unresolved
safety risk factors for STS-40 (if any) are addressed in Section 3.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each risk factor in this section are
listed beneath the anomaly rifle. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
anomaly, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
m
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SECTION 5 INDEX
STS-39 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
INTEGRATIQN
Abort Region Determinator indicated different abort boundary times
than what was expected.
PAGE
5-3
ORBITER
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Flash Evaporator System feedline "A", system #2, heater failure.
Auxiliary Power Unit #2 Fuel Pump/Gas Generator Valve Module
coolant system "A" valve did not open.
Reaction Control System vernier thruster F5R fuel injector
temperature biased low.
Operations recorder #2 uncommanded configuration before launch
(potential Multiplexer-Demultiplexer hybrid circuit failure).
Supply water dump nozzle temperature drop.
Atudliary Power Unit #2 lube oil outlet pressure was low.
Right-hand outboard Main Landing Gear tire excessive wear.
Loss of communications during entry.
The Pilot's Rotation Hand Control bottomed-out during entry.
SSME
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump secondary seal cavity pressure
sensor failure on STS-39, engine #2029.
SRM
Right-hand Solid Rocket Motor nozzle cowl/outer boot ring
erosion/washing.
5-4
5-6
5-7
5-9
5-11
5-12
5-14
5-15
5-17
5-18
5-21
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SECTION 6
STS-35 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
STS-35/OV-102 mission, the previous flight of the Orbiter vehicle. Each anomaly is
briefly described, and risk acceptance information and rationale are provided.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each anomaly in this section are
listed beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
anomaly, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
6-1 STS-40 Postflight Edition
SECTION 6 INDEX
STS-35 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR PAGE
INTEGRATION
Backup Flight System software patch for pad B definition of
longitudinal location was incorrect.
ORBITER
2
3
4
5
10
11
6-3
Left Reaction Control System drain panel heater "A" was not at 6-5
normal temperature.
Degradation of wastewater dump function. 6-6
-Z star tracker Serial Number 006 failed 2 initial self-tests. 6-9
Payload Bay Door environmental seal debond. 6-10
Water Spray Boiler #3A operation was abnormal during ascent and 6-11
entry.
Window W-1 has a 0.15-inch diameter chip. 6-12
Water Spray Boiler #2 was subjected to abnormally large quantities of 6-13
wax.
Reaction Control System vernier thruster R5D failed "off'. 6-14
Orbiter/External Tank Liquid Oxygen aft attach/separation hole 6-15
plugger did not fully extend.
Right-hand stop bolt was found bent on the STS-35 centering ring of 6-16
the forward External Tank attach/separation assembly.
Pilot seat down-limit switch failure. 6-18
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SECTION 7
STS-40 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
STS40/OV-102 mission. Each anomaly is briefly described.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each risk factor in this section are
listed beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
anomaly, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
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SECTION 7 INDEX
STS-40 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. N).
RISK
FACTOR PAGE
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
Inertial Measurement Unit #2, Serial Number 023, failed preflight
calibration.
1307 bulkhead environmental seal and thermal blanket anomalies.
Heat erosion of STS-40/OV-102 fight-hand External Tank umbilical
door eenterline latch.
Auxiliary Power Unit #1 fuel test line temperature above Fault
Detection and Annunciation alarm limits.
Cylindrical object debris seen at External Tank separation.
Vernier thruster L5L failed off due to low Chamber Pressure.
7-3
7-4
7-6
7-8
7-8
7-9
7-2 STS-40 Postflight Edition
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SECTION $
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
This section contains pertinent background information on the safety risk factors
and anomalies addressed in Sections 3 through 7. It is intended as a supplement to
provide more detailed data if required. This section is available upon request.
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AP
A/D
AEM
AFB
ALCA
amp
AP
APU
AR
ARC
ARD
ASA
BFS
BITE
BOB
C
CA
CCP
CEI
CIL
COAS
CPU
CR
Crit
CTI
CWC
CWS
DAR
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS
Delta Pressure
Analog-to-Digital
Animal Enclosure Module
Air Force Base
Aft Load Controller Assembly
Ampere
Ammonium Perchlorate
Auxiliary Power Unit
Accepted Risk
Ames Research Center
Abort Region Determinator
Aerosurface Amplifier
Backup Flight System
Built-In Test Equipment
Breakout Box
Controlled
California
Carbon Cloth Phenolic
Contractor End-Item
Critical Items List
Crew Optical Alignment Sight
Central Processing Unit
Change Request
Criticality
Charlton Technologies, Inc.
Contingency Water Container
Caution and Warning System
Deviation Approval Request
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
EAFB
ECLSS
EDT
EIU
EMI
EPR
ET
EVA
F
FA
FA-2
FASCOS
FC
FCL
FCV
FD
FDA
FES
FID
FMEA
FMEA/CIL
FOS
FP
FPM
FR
FRR
FRSI
FSR
ft
GAS
GGVM
GH2
GO 2
GOX
GPC
GSE
Edwards Air Force Base
Environmental Control and Life Support System
Eastern Daylight Time
Engine Interface Unit
Electromagnetic Interference
Ethylene Propylene Rubber
External Tank
Extravehicular Activity
Fahrenheit
Flight Aft
Flight Aft-2
Flight Acceleration Safety Cutoff System
Flight Critical
Freon Coolant Loop
Flow Control Valve
Flight Day
Fault Detection and Annunciation
Flash Evaporator System
Fault Identification
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List
Factor of Safety
Fuel Pump
Flow Proportional Module
Flight Rule
Flight Readiness Review
Felt Reusable Surface Insulation
Flight Safety Review
Feet
Get-Away Special
Gas Generator Valve Module
Gaseous Hydrogen
Gaseous Oxygen
Gaseous Oxygen
General Purpose Computer
Ground Support Equipment
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS . CONTINUED
n 2
HAC
HCF
HDP
HGDS
HPFTP
HPOTP
HPU
HR
hr
HSL
i/o
IBR
ICC
ICD
IFA
IMU
in-lb
IOM
lOP
ISL
isp
JSC
KSC
kt
1_,-2
lb
lb/hr
lbf
LCC
LH
LH 2
LiOH
LLCO
LO2
LPFTP
Hydrogen
Heading Alignment Cone
High-Cycle Fatigue
Holddown Post
Hazardous Gas Detection System
High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Hydraulic Power Unit
Hazard Report
Hour
Huntsville Simulation Laboratory
Input/Output
Inner Boot Ring
Inter-Computer Channel
Interface Control Document
Inflight Anomaly
Inertial Measurement Unit
Inch-Pound
Input/Output Module
Input/Output Processor
Inertial Systems Laboratory
Specific Impulse
Johnson Space Center
Kennedy Space Center
Knot
Launch Minus 2 Day
Pound
Pounds Per Hour
Pounds-Force
Launch Commit Criteria
Left-Hand
Liquid Hydrogen
Lithium Hydroxide
Low-Level Cutoff
Liquid Oxygen
Low-Pressure. Fuel Turbopump
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS . CONTINUED
LPOTP
LSFR
MCC
MDM
ME
MEC
MECO
MIA
min
MISO
MLG
MLP
MODE-0
MPS
MRB
ms
MSE
MSFC
NASA
NDE
NLG
NSI
NSRS
OBBFX
OBR
OEX
OMI
OMRSD
OMS
OPS
OSMQ
ORBI
OV
Low-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Launch Site Flow Review
Main Combustion Chamber
Multiplexer-Demultiplexer
Main Engine
Main Engine Controller
Master Event Controller
Main Engine Cutoff
Multiplexer Interface Adapter
Minute
Multiple Inlet, Single Outlet
Main Landing Gear
Mobile Launch Platform
Middeck 0-Gravity Dynamics Experiment-0
Main Propulsion System
Material Review Board
Millisecond
Mission Safety Evaluation
Marshall Space Flight Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Nondestructive Evaluation
Nose Landing Gear
NASA Standard Initator
NASA Safety Reporting System
Orbital Ball Bearing Experiment
Outer Boot Ring
Orbiter Experiments
Operations and Maintenance Instruction
Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
Orbital Maneuvering System
Operations
Office of Safety and Mission Quality
Orbiter
Orbiter Vehicle
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P/N
PAR
PASS
Pc
PDT
PF2
PLB
PLBD
PMS
POR
ppm
PRCB
PROM
psi
psia
psid
PSIG
PSN
QD
RCS
RFCA
RGA
RH
RHC
RI
RM
RSRM
RTLS
RTV
S/N
scch
sccm
SCCS
scfm
SCU
sec
SEM
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
Part Number
Prelaunch Assessment Review
Primary Avionics System Software
Chamber Pressure
Pacific Daylight Time
Payload Forward 2
Payload Bay
Payload Bay Door
Physiological Monitoring System
Power-On Reset
Parts Per Million
Program Requirements Control Board
Programmable Read-Only Memory
Pounds Per Square Inch
Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute
Pounds Per Square Inch Differential
Propulsion Systems Integration Group
Purge Sequence Number
Quick Disconnect.
Reaction Control System
Radiator Flow Control Assembly
Rate Gyro Assembly
Right-Hand
Rotation Hand Controller
Rockwell International
Redundancy Management
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor
Return to Launch Site
Room-Temperature Vulcanizing
Serial Number
Standard Cubic Centimeters Per Hour
Standard Cubic Centimeters Per Minute
Standard Cubic Centimeters Per Second
Standard Cubic Feet Per Minute
Sequence Control Unit
Second
Scanning Electron Microscope
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS . CONTINUED
SLF
SLS
SMS
SODB
SRB
SRM
SSIP
SSME
SSRP
SSV
TAEM
TAL
TC
TDRS
TDRSS
TEM
TPS
TVC
UMS
WECCO
WSB
Shuttle Landing Facility
Spacelab Life Sciences
Space Motion Sickness
Shuttle Operational Data Book
Solid Rocket Booster
Solid Rocket Motor
Shuttle Software Interface Processing
Space Shuttle Main Engine
System Safety Review Panel
Space Shuttle Vehicle
Terminal Area Energy Management
Transatlantic Abort Landing
Thiokol Corporation
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
Test and Evaluation Motor
Thermal Protection System
Thrust Vector Control
Urine Monitoring System
Western Electro Chemical Corporation
Water Spray Boiler
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